Skip to main content

Vice test nails Indonesian politicians

It's been just 10 years since Indonesia held its first open elections after more than 30 years of president Suharto's authoritarian rule. In that short time, the nation's 175 million voters have matured, making the world's third-largest democracy a model for Asia and the Muslim world. Unfortunately, Indonesia's politicians haven't progressed as much as its voters. Flailing following last month's legislative elections illustrated just how immature Indonesia's politicians remain. After weeks of meetings to build coalitions strictly focused on the interests of politicians, rather than governing, voters will have the choice of three seriously flawed presidential tickets in the July presidential vote.
Former president Megawati Sukarnoputri holds what is likely a unique distinction in the history of democracy. As party leader, Megawati has led her PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) into three legislative votes, capturing a lower percentage of votes every time. Yet she has remained party leader, and she's now making her third run for the presidency. That would just be folly on the part of Megawati and her party if it ended there. But it gets worse. Fingered by fateThrough little fault of her own, Megawati ushered in the reformasi movement that ousted Suharto's New Order regime. In 1993, she was elected leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), one of two officially sanctioned New Order opposition parties. PDI became mildly critical of the government under Megawati, daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, who was, coincidentally, overthrown by Suharto. The empire struck back in 1966, orchestrating a party coup to restore PDI's former chairman Suryadi at a party congress that excluded Megawati and her backers. Megawati's faction didn't recognize the result and occupied PDI's headquarters in Jakarta. The situation escalated when Megawati's side began staging a series of what it termed "democracy forum" meetings, the biggest public display of opposition to Suharto in decades. On July 27, 1996, thugs officially identified as Suryadi supporters - but widely believed to have been military personnel - evicted Megawati's faction from PDI headquarters. More than 200 Megawati supporters were arrested and dozens are believed to have been killed in what's now known as Black Saturday. The incident made Megawati the symbolic leader of the reformasi movement, leading to her presidency. Yet even during Megawati's administration, there was never an investigation of Black Saturday to determine what actually happened, identify the dead or hold any of the perpetrators responsible. Few doubt the military, under orders from Suharto, was behind the 1996 attack. The specialist in these kinds of black operations, and implicated in just about every category of abuse that reformasi aimed to end, was General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's one-time son-in-law and heir apparent. Now the retired general and admitted kidnapper is Megawati's running mate. Heartbeat awayNever mind the potential danger of giving this brand of human-rights abuser renewed access to the levers of power, nor the stupidity of putting such a nefarious figure a heartbeat away from the presidency, particularly when it's your very own heartbeat in his way. His presence under the PDI-P banner goes well beyond the usual Indonesian political habit of ignoring ideology and policy to create incoherent coalitions.
Running with Prabowo, Megawati is telling her 1996 supporters that they were fools, defecating on the unmarked graves of Black Saturday victims and rubbing their families' faces in her mess. As horrifying as Megawati's choice is, her presidential opponents have done something more despicable. Megawati has merely insulted her supporters and martyrs whose blood set the stage for reforming Indonesia. The electoral shenanigans of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice President Jusuf Kalla pose a greater danger to the country. For all the evil that the Megawati-Prabowo ticket represents, it has little chance of being elected. Yudhoyono and Kalla have already done their damage. The quick count results of legislative voting showed SBY is very likely to be reelected. Official results released two weeks ago confirmed SBY's Democratic Party won 20.9% of the vote, up from 7.5% in 2004. Kalla's Golkar party, founded as Suharto's ruling vehicle, received 14.5%, down from 21.6% five years ago.
Kalla's follyTo most observers it appeared that Kalla's plan to run for president was hopeless and that his best option was to remain as SBY's vice president. (See Indonesia's Kalla faces toughest test, Asia Times Online, April 15) Even though Golkar under Kalla's leadership had lost popularity, the vote was a clear endorsement of the SBY administration, and Kalla has been an integral part of it. The two make a good team. Yudhoyono is deliberative, a general who never fires a shot in anger, while Kalla is a doer who put his political ambitions on hold to take over the crumbling family business and turn it into one of the most successful companies in eastern Indonesia. Golkar's partnership with SBY gave the party a place in the governing coalition, a share of the political spoils and the right to claim a share of the administration' s success. The latter will be extraordinarily important during a presumed second Yudhoyono term. Indonesia's post-New Order constitution prohibits the president from being elected to a third term. The Democrat Party has no popular elected figure other than Yudhoyono; as a full partner in the SBY presidency, Golkar might stake a claim as its logical successor. Events were moving toward a reprise of an SBY-JK ticket until egos got in the way. Flushed with victory and undoubtedly resenting Kalla's assertion that he'd be a more active and decisive leader, Yudhoyono insisted that Golkar submit a list of names to be considered for the vice presidency. Kalla took that for the insult it was meant to be and decided he wouldn't swallow it. So in defiance of many Golkar elders and undoubtedly drawing the curtain on his tenure as party leader and a significant player on the national stage, Kalla embarked on a futile run for the presidency. He's taken retired general Wiranto, another New Order accused rights abuser (and Prabowo's former boss), as his running mate and will soon learn that Golkar's brand is more popular than he is. We are not amused Yudhoyono may have only meant to humiliate Kalla, not drive him away. But exacting revenge underscored a pettiness in SBY, a tendency to take things personally. In it, there's a whiff of the Javanese royal pretense that he shares with Megawati. Although it was Megawati who shunned SBY after he left her cabinet to run for president in 2004, he's let the situation simmer for five years and made himself a participant in her feud. SBY's choice of former economics minister and central bank governor Boediono to replace Kalla on the ticket displays similar hubris, as well his cautious nature.
Yudhoyono ignored his coalition partners to make the choice, confident that they need him more than he needs them. His partners are mostly Islamic parties, whose vote total declined from nearly 38% in 2004 to just over 30% this time. Choosing an Islamist could alienate mainstream voters: many voters Asia Times Online spoke with said they favored a second term for SBY as long as he didn't choose an Islamist running mate. So SBY made a safe choice, a non-politician with whom he wouldn't have to share the spotlight and would minimize the offense to voters and coalition partners, compared with choosing the member of a rival party. The choice also fails to indicate an heir to SBY for the Democrat Party. Boediono's economic credentials seem useful in a global recession, but he may have been more useful in a more specific financial role. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether SBY and Boediono can forge the same kind of complimentary, effective partnership that SBY and Kalla had. With the world economy in crisis and so much unfinished business for Indonesia, this is no time for Indonesia's leaders to be taking unnecessary chances. Yudhoyono and Kalla could have given voters the opportunity to give a mandate to the team they obviously prefer. Instead pettiness, ego and naked self-interest won the day. It's time for the politicians' maturity to catch up with the body politic.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

child sex workers in Bandung

A policeman, right, watches over two masseuses and their customers during a raid on suspected prostitution activities at a hotel in Changchun, in northeast China's Jilin province The Bandung authority is at loss to uncover cases of covert prostitution involving junior and senior high school students, whose number continues to rise in the West Java capital. Eli, a sex worker advocacy program mentor from the Rumah Cemara Group in Bandung, said it was hard to provide advocacy to teenagers involved in covert prostitution since most were not receptive. The number of those involved in covert prostitution is believed to be higher compared to commercial sex on the streets, she added. Eli has been providing support to more than 200 housewives and child sex workers over the past two years, around 20 of who are senior high school students between the ages of 15 and 16. "They are psychologically unstable at those ages. They are hard to handle due to their strong motivation to ea

Bricklaying in Aceh

Refleksi: http://www.thejakartapost.com/detaileditorial.asp?fileid= 20070405. F07&irec= 6 Bricklaying in Aceh I was looking back the other day at a letter in the British newspaper The Times as written by Professor H. H. Turner in January 1925, who was challenging the government's statement that a good British bricklayer would lay 500 bricks per day which made him the best in the world.The professor claimed to have found one bricklayer who dealt with 2000 bricks in eight hours and another one who laid 890 bricks in just one hour -- one presumes the brickie ran out of steam after a while. It made me wonder just how many bricks were being laid in Aceh province, bearing in mind the climatic differences between gloomy old England and sun-drenched Indonesia. The heat factor alone could well in fact reduce the work rate by up to fifty percent, and then of course there are the incentive factors of salary and working conditions. An English bricklayer in 1925 would have earned about one

Debate Islam in Indonesia

http://www.thejakar taglobe.com/ opinion/interloc utors-of- indonesian- islam/560447 Interlocutors of Indonesian Islam Ahmad Najib Burhani | December 08, 2012 A few months ago, the Japanese anthropologist Mitsuo Nakamura told me that studying Nahdlatul Ulama as an organization was beyond the imagination of any American scholar from the 1950s to the ’70s. But he is not the only academic to have noticed this. George McT. Kahin of Cornell University stated the same thing. Even NU-expert Martin van Bruinessen was not expecting to study NU as his primary focus when he came to Indonesia for the first time in the 1980s.   During the early decades of Indonesian independence, NU was relatively unorganized and its management was largely based on the authority of religious teachers ( kyai ). Of course there were a number of scholars who studied NU-affiliated religious schools ( pesantren ) and its kyai, but not NU as an organization.   Even though NU was one of the winners o