Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has won high marks from both the United States and Australia for his government's efforts to combat terrorism, including the recent capture or elimination of at least 200 terror suspects. But a new front may be opening in strife-torn Sulawesi. Security analysts have noted that since the elite counter-terrorism Detachment 88, supplied and trained by the US and Australia, ramped up its counter-terrorism operations, there have over the past 18 months conspicuously been no new major terrorist attacks against local or Western targets. Now, however, a dangerous new front is opening in the Poso area of Central Sulawesi province that threatens to spiral into a new regional security hot spot and raises new questions about the effectiveness of Indonesia's anti-terrorism operations.
Fear, loathing and violence are not new to religiously divided Poso. An estimated 2,000 people were killed in communal fighting between Muslims and Christians in the area until an accord was brokered by the central government in 2002. That deal never fully took hold and the Jemaah Islamiyah terror group has recently exploited the tensions for its own ideological ends. Several JI operatives have allegedly gathered in the coastal Poso region to regroup, recruit, and perhaps even plan new attacks across the archipelago. Indonesia's anti-terrorism chief, retired General Ansyaad Mbai, and General A M Hendropriyono, former State Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief, have both said in recent interviews that the renewed violence in Poso is the work of JI-inspired terrorists.
Authorities say they are trying to link local players involved in the region's recent violence to the wider JI network. JI operatives have reportedly recently landed in Poso from former sanctuaries in the southern Philippines, where they were once welcomed by the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front, but have more recently been flushed out by US-backed counter-terrorism sweeps by the Philippine armed forces. Indonesian authorities have encountered heavily armed fighters during their recent Poso operations and claim to have uncovered large weapons caches during raids, which they contend originated from the southern Philippines. Regional intelligence officials have long claimed that JI ran a guerrilla training camp at Abubakar, a remote jungle-covered area on the Philippines' southern island of Mindanao.
If indeed JI is now regrouping in Poso, as Indonesian authorities contend, it marks a worrisome new development. JI was responsible for the 2002 Bali bomb attacks, which killed more than 200 people, including 88 Australians, as well as the bombings in 2005 of the J W Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. According to Western and regional intelligence officials, JI's motivating ambition is to create a regional Muslim caliphate encompassing territories in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and the Philippines. The group reportedly has four main operational divisions scattered across the region: Mantiqi I, which covers peninsular Malaysia and Singapore; Mantiqi II, based in Central Java, which covers Java, Sumatra, and most of eastern Indonesia; Mantiqi III, which encompasses Sabah, East Kalimantan and Sulawesi; and Mantiqi IV, which includes territories in Papua and Australia. Through mainly covert operations, Indonesian counter-terrorism forces, with US and Australian support, are now aggressively aiming to defuse that plan by intensifying their activities in Central and East Java.
For instance, Detachment 88 tracked down and killed in East Java bomb maker Azahari bin Hussin, a Malaysian who reportedly played a pivotal role in both the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings. In late January, Detachment 88 raided the houses of alleged Muslim militants in Poso, where several suspects were detained and at least 16 killed, including Ustadz Mahmud and Ustadz Riansyah, both considered senior JI members. Two days after the crackdown, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group released a report suggesting that militants based in Poso might extend their violent operations beyond Central Sulawesi province and aim for targets on the main island of Java. The report also raised the possibility that certain leading militants have already crossed into Java to link up with JI operational leader Noordin Mohammed Top, currently the most wanted terrorist in the region, who is believed to be holed up somewhere in Java. Australia, Thailand and the Philippines have all since issued advisories warning their citizens against travel not just to Sulawesi but to Indonesia as a whole, citing unconfirmed intelligence reports that Indonesia-based terrorists were in the advanced stages of planning new attacks. There are concerns among certain security analysts that JI might attempt to stir violence in Poso on par with the shadowy and destabilizing insurgent operations now seen in southern Thailand. The government's operations in Poso are galvanizing known Islamic radicals. Firebrand Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was convicted (but soon thereafter released) on conspiracy charges related to his role in the 2002 Bali bombings, and who has been tagged by both Australia and the US as one of the region's most dangerous terrorists, has called on all Muslims to stop serving in the government's counter-terrorism forces in Poso. Ba'asyir has consistently denied the charges against him and has frequently denied that JI even exists. Still, he has recently called his followers to violent action.
"If necessary, we must organize a jihad," said Ba'asyir to a group of angry protesters who had gathered outside the National Human Rights Commission to protest the government's handling of the Poso raids. "If Muslims are being killed, then we must fight back," he added. Counter-terrorism chief General Mbai has recently claimed publicly that Ba'asyir serves as a mentor for many JI militants in Poso. According to intelligence sources, Ba'asyir's followers in Solo several years ago set recruitment activities and training camps in firearms near Poso. Among those alleged JI recruits was Hasanuddin, who experienced fighting in the southern Philippines, moved to Poso in September 2002 and later became the reputed leader of Mantiqi III.
He has been implicated in several acts of communal violence and was finally arrested last May for the gruesome crime of beheading three Christian schoolgirls. During interrogation, he has allegedly provided the names of several other JI operatives in the region that Detachment 88 is now hunting. Those operations, however, threaten to inflame the historically restive region into new violence. Last month, Vice President Jusuf Kalla called a meeting of several influential Islamic figures to discuss the conflict in Poso. So far these discussions have only highlighted criticism of the government's handling of the situation, which the Islamic leaders say is only serving to mobilize extremist sentiments and pave the way for militant recruitment. For instance, Tifatul Sembiring, chairman of the Muslim Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), was quoted in the local press saying police should be more selective in deciding on the targets of their security operations. Jafar Umar Thalib, a former radical militant who once headed the now-disbanded Laskar Jihad group, was closely linked to the fighting in Sulawesi in 2000 and 2001. He recently met with Kalla and thereafter told Adnkronos International in an interview that although JI in Central Sulawesi would likely be defeated by the army within the next six months, "holy war" could spread to other parts of Indonesia.
Whether Thalib was privy to inside information from Poso cells is unclear, but his predictions sent a chilling warning. As Indonesia girds itself for a potential full-blown insurgency in Poso, the US has offered Jakarta an unprecedented helping hand in its counter-terrorism operations. Police chief General Sutanto recently confirmed that US authorities have agreed to allow Jakarta access to Indonesia-born terror suspect Riduan Isamuddin, or Hambali, whom the US captured in Thailand in August 2003. According to Western and regional intelligence agencies, Hambali is the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings and JI's alleged point man with al-Qaeda. Until recently the US held Hambali at one of the Central Intelligence Agency's secret prisons, and over the past three years had denied Jakarta's requests to interrogate the suspect in person. Earlier, the US would only permit Indonesia to submit questions to be asked by US interrogators at the secret location. Three and a half years since his arrest, Hambali's knowledge of JI's current plans is probably minimal. And if the situation in Poso escalates, as many fear, Indonesian authorities are going to need all the inside knowledge and outside help they can get.
Fear, loathing and violence are not new to religiously divided Poso. An estimated 2,000 people were killed in communal fighting between Muslims and Christians in the area until an accord was brokered by the central government in 2002. That deal never fully took hold and the Jemaah Islamiyah terror group has recently exploited the tensions for its own ideological ends. Several JI operatives have allegedly gathered in the coastal Poso region to regroup, recruit, and perhaps even plan new attacks across the archipelago. Indonesia's anti-terrorism chief, retired General Ansyaad Mbai, and General A M Hendropriyono, former State Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief, have both said in recent interviews that the renewed violence in Poso is the work of JI-inspired terrorists.
Authorities say they are trying to link local players involved in the region's recent violence to the wider JI network. JI operatives have reportedly recently landed in Poso from former sanctuaries in the southern Philippines, where they were once welcomed by the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front, but have more recently been flushed out by US-backed counter-terrorism sweeps by the Philippine armed forces. Indonesian authorities have encountered heavily armed fighters during their recent Poso operations and claim to have uncovered large weapons caches during raids, which they contend originated from the southern Philippines. Regional intelligence officials have long claimed that JI ran a guerrilla training camp at Abubakar, a remote jungle-covered area on the Philippines' southern island of Mindanao.
If indeed JI is now regrouping in Poso, as Indonesian authorities contend, it marks a worrisome new development. JI was responsible for the 2002 Bali bomb attacks, which killed more than 200 people, including 88 Australians, as well as the bombings in 2005 of the J W Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. According to Western and regional intelligence officials, JI's motivating ambition is to create a regional Muslim caliphate encompassing territories in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and the Philippines. The group reportedly has four main operational divisions scattered across the region: Mantiqi I, which covers peninsular Malaysia and Singapore; Mantiqi II, based in Central Java, which covers Java, Sumatra, and most of eastern Indonesia; Mantiqi III, which encompasses Sabah, East Kalimantan and Sulawesi; and Mantiqi IV, which includes territories in Papua and Australia. Through mainly covert operations, Indonesian counter-terrorism forces, with US and Australian support, are now aggressively aiming to defuse that plan by intensifying their activities in Central and East Java.
For instance, Detachment 88 tracked down and killed in East Java bomb maker Azahari bin Hussin, a Malaysian who reportedly played a pivotal role in both the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings. In late January, Detachment 88 raided the houses of alleged Muslim militants in Poso, where several suspects were detained and at least 16 killed, including Ustadz Mahmud and Ustadz Riansyah, both considered senior JI members. Two days after the crackdown, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group released a report suggesting that militants based in Poso might extend their violent operations beyond Central Sulawesi province and aim for targets on the main island of Java. The report also raised the possibility that certain leading militants have already crossed into Java to link up with JI operational leader Noordin Mohammed Top, currently the most wanted terrorist in the region, who is believed to be holed up somewhere in Java. Australia, Thailand and the Philippines have all since issued advisories warning their citizens against travel not just to Sulawesi but to Indonesia as a whole, citing unconfirmed intelligence reports that Indonesia-based terrorists were in the advanced stages of planning new attacks. There are concerns among certain security analysts that JI might attempt to stir violence in Poso on par with the shadowy and destabilizing insurgent operations now seen in southern Thailand. The government's operations in Poso are galvanizing known Islamic radicals. Firebrand Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was convicted (but soon thereafter released) on conspiracy charges related to his role in the 2002 Bali bombings, and who has been tagged by both Australia and the US as one of the region's most dangerous terrorists, has called on all Muslims to stop serving in the government's counter-terrorism forces in Poso. Ba'asyir has consistently denied the charges against him and has frequently denied that JI even exists. Still, he has recently called his followers to violent action.
"If necessary, we must organize a jihad," said Ba'asyir to a group of angry protesters who had gathered outside the National Human Rights Commission to protest the government's handling of the Poso raids. "If Muslims are being killed, then we must fight back," he added. Counter-terrorism chief General Mbai has recently claimed publicly that Ba'asyir serves as a mentor for many JI militants in Poso. According to intelligence sources, Ba'asyir's followers in Solo several years ago set recruitment activities and training camps in firearms near Poso. Among those alleged JI recruits was Hasanuddin, who experienced fighting in the southern Philippines, moved to Poso in September 2002 and later became the reputed leader of Mantiqi III.
He has been implicated in several acts of communal violence and was finally arrested last May for the gruesome crime of beheading three Christian schoolgirls. During interrogation, he has allegedly provided the names of several other JI operatives in the region that Detachment 88 is now hunting. Those operations, however, threaten to inflame the historically restive region into new violence. Last month, Vice President Jusuf Kalla called a meeting of several influential Islamic figures to discuss the conflict in Poso. So far these discussions have only highlighted criticism of the government's handling of the situation, which the Islamic leaders say is only serving to mobilize extremist sentiments and pave the way for militant recruitment. For instance, Tifatul Sembiring, chairman of the Muslim Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), was quoted in the local press saying police should be more selective in deciding on the targets of their security operations. Jafar Umar Thalib, a former radical militant who once headed the now-disbanded Laskar Jihad group, was closely linked to the fighting in Sulawesi in 2000 and 2001. He recently met with Kalla and thereafter told Adnkronos International in an interview that although JI in Central Sulawesi would likely be defeated by the army within the next six months, "holy war" could spread to other parts of Indonesia.
Whether Thalib was privy to inside information from Poso cells is unclear, but his predictions sent a chilling warning. As Indonesia girds itself for a potential full-blown insurgency in Poso, the US has offered Jakarta an unprecedented helping hand in its counter-terrorism operations. Police chief General Sutanto recently confirmed that US authorities have agreed to allow Jakarta access to Indonesia-born terror suspect Riduan Isamuddin, or Hambali, whom the US captured in Thailand in August 2003. According to Western and regional intelligence agencies, Hambali is the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings and JI's alleged point man with al-Qaeda. Until recently the US held Hambali at one of the Central Intelligence Agency's secret prisons, and over the past three years had denied Jakarta's requests to interrogate the suspect in person. Earlier, the US would only permit Indonesia to submit questions to be asked by US interrogators at the secret location. Three and a half years since his arrest, Hambali's knowledge of JI's current plans is probably minimal. And if the situation in Poso escalates, as many fear, Indonesian authorities are going to need all the inside knowledge and outside help they can get.
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