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Aburizal's precarious position

The day after Greenpeace activists dumped 700 kilograms of Sidoarjo's mud in the compound of his office, Coordinating Minister for the People's Welfare Aburizal Bakrie mulled taking legal action against them.

On Sept. 27 -- almost at the same time as a Cabinet meeting declared the afflicted region a disaster area -- Greenpeace Southeast Asia demanded that Lapindo Brantas Inc. take full responsibility for the disaster, which has been unstoppable for the last four months.

The protesters demanded that the government seek every avenue to stop the mudflow and make sure no taxpayers' money was spent on dealing with the man-made disaster. The mudflow has been gushing out of a gas exploration well controlled by the Bakrie family, one of the largest and most well-connected industrial conglomerates in the country.

Aburizal's spokesman firmly says the minister does not want the public to connect the Lapindo case with his office. Furthermore, the spokesman denies any direct link between Lapindo and Aburizal Bakrie. Reportedly, Aburizal declared the Greenpeace protest had nothing to do with him in his capacity as minister and blamed the protesters for misunderstanding the problem. Moreover, he questioned whether they were genuine Greenpeace members.

Aburizal appears hostile toward his critics. It is certainly true that he is not the person responsible for the wrongdoings of Lapindo, since he is no longer the CEO of the Bakrie business empire. As an individual who partly owns the business, however, he has a moral responsibility for the catastrophe, which was caused by the company rather than a natural disaster.

Apparently Aburizal wants to strictly separate his ministerial position from his role as a politically well-connected business tycoon-cum-politici an. Even so, it is naive of him if he does not want to pay any attention to the Lapindo fiasco, since the oil field in Sidoarjo has been declared a disaster region.

In his capacity as chief welfare minister, he must swiftly offer help to the victims of the disaster. It is his job to think and to take concrete action to save the victims. Only on Oct. 8 did he finally pay a trip to the site of the mudflow disaster, which began on May 29.

If the authorities prove Lapindo guilty of any wrongdoing or negligence in the drilling process in Sidoarjo, it will surely damage Aburizal's credibility.

The public has increasingly blamed the disaster on Lapindo and Aburizal Bakrie as the owner of the business empire. The company has been dubbed inexperienced and incompetent in drilling. Furthermore, the public has been outraged by the attitude of Lapindo and the government in handling the disaster.

The Jakarta Post's special report on Aug. 24 gave a pretty clear idea of how Lapindo has used improper and politically incorrect measures to clean up its image. The company has hired professional image builders in order to save face. It has established a media center where free internet access, telephone use, printing and photocopy facilities are available. In short, Lapindo has an interest in protecting the name of Aburizal Bakrie from being stained by the mudflow.

The improper attitude of Lapindo became obvious when a security guard from the company beat up TV journalists who were covering the visit of Energy Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro -- as the chair of the National Team on Handling the Sidoarjo Mudflow Flow -- to the disaster site on Oct. 1.

The story of Aburizal and his family business speaks volumes about the conflict of interest facing a businessman who has to protect, expand and save his business and political interests, and at the same time hold public office.

Apparently the hot mudflow and Aburizal's strategy for dealing with the disaster have landed him in deep mud. His political career may be in trouble.

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